

# The President's Daily Brief

April 6, 1976

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Top Secret

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013300010005-4

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#### USSR

A review of satellite photography taken between shows that the Soviets have made little effort since January to meet the requirements for dismantling older ICBM launchers. Indeed, no activity has been evident at most of the partially dismantled launchers for several months or more.

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The only dismantling activity observed since January has been the removal of some of the internal components from nine SS-7 silos. Under the terms of the Interim Agreement the Soviets should have had 23 older ICBM or submarine-launched ballistic-missile launchers fully dismantled by January 23, and 51 dismantled by about March 1.

Initially they appeared to be complying with the agreement. By late December they had begun to dismantle 51 SS-7 above-ground and silo launchers. The work lagged, however, and we can only confirm that eight launchers are fully dismantled. The Soviets themselves admitted on March 30 that they had fully dismantled only 10 older ICBM launchers.

All of the 209 original SS-7 and SS-8 launchers were photographed on several occasions during the mission, and nearly all were seen at least once since about mid-March. No additional SS-7 launchers were observed being dismantled nor were there any indications that the Soviets had started dismantling any SS-8 ICBM launchers or older SLBM launchers.

The two additional launchers counted by the Soviets as fully dismantled may be at the Yoshkar-Ola complex. At one of the SS-7 sites the control bunker has been dismantled, and the two launch pads have been partially excavated. The propellant tanks at these facilities also must be removed, however, to comply with the dismantling requirements. The propellant facilities appeared intact

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
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The reasons given last week by the Soviets for not fully dismantling all 51 launchers are not compelling. They said that they have encountered difficulties and implied that they could not use explosives because nearby buildings might be damaged. The photography, however, shows that the nearest buildings are too far away to be damaged.

The level of activity in other areas at the complexes containing the partially dismantled SS-7 launchers suggests that weather and manpower were not major factors in the slowdown of dismantling. The Soviets continue to build new launch control silos or to modify SS-11 silos for new missiles at many of the complexes containing partially dismantled SS-7 silos, and an exercise was noted at an operational SS-7 site, at the Kostroma complex.

The lack of activity at the partially dismantled sites makes it impossible to project when work on all 51 launchers might be completed. The Soviets probably could fully dismantle an SS-7 site containing two above-ground launchers or three silos within about four to six weeks. With a concerted effort, they probably could complete the dismantlement of all 43 partially dismantled launchers in two to three months.



#### LEBANON

Sporadic fighting flared up yesterday in the mountains east of Beirut where leftist and Christian militiamen resumed their struggle for control over the Christian villages of Aynturah and Al Mutayn. Leaders on both sides seem willing to tolerate breaches of the truce in outlying areas as long as the capital remains relatively calm.

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some Syrian reservists have been recalled to active duty over the last several weeks and others notified of a possible recall. The attaché reports that there are no signs of a general mobilization or an imminent move by Syrian forces.

No Syrian patrol boats were detected operating in Lebanese waters off Tripoli yesterday, although it is not clear whether Damascus has totally lifted its blockade of the Lebanese port.

Muslim and Christian politicians continued their strident public debate over the timing, venue, and security arrangements for convening parliament, but they may have reached some points of tentative agreement—at least on an acceptable

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site for the session. The Muslim-controlled radio in Beirut states that major Christian leaders-including Interior Minister Shamun--have agreed to hold the meeting in a so-called neutral area of Beirut.

The more controversial question of which force will protect the assembly apparently has not been resolved. Jumblatt's recent accusations against Syria almost certainly mean he will not accept Syrian-controlled Palestinian forces as the sole guardians of the parliament.

The debate over a successor to President Franjiyah is likely to remain deadlocked until the Christian Phalanges Party and Jumblatt's leftist coalition hold meetings later this week. The list of possible compromise candidates is growing each day; none of those mentioned, however, has gained even tacit approval from the Syrians, the Christians, or the Muslim left.

#### CHINA

The massive pro - Chou En-lai demonstrations in Peking on Monday, as well as poster attacks elsewhere in China on unnamed but important persons who are said to have denigrated Chou, appear to be part of an orchestrated campaign against party leftists who have been working to oust Chou's chosen successor, Teng Hsiao-ping.

Moderate leaders, who seem to be trying to protect Teng and preserve the policies for which he and Chou stood, apparently have seized on the highly popular issue of paying tribute to the deceased premier as a vehicle to turn the attacks on Teng around. The unruly behavior of the crowds in Peking, estimated at over 100,000, is uncharacteristic of the normally timid Peking residents and strongly suggests that these people were given the green light to hold demonstrations by important figures in the leadership. The fact that security personnel and unarmed military men did little to interfere with the demonstrations itself implies official sanction.

The current defense of Chou contains thinly veiled attacks on Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, and on three members of the party's ruling Politburo who hail from Shanghai. These four people, all members of the party's left wing, undoubtedly are in the forefront of the anti-Teng campaign. Unlike the criticism of Teng, which has fallen short of calling for his ouster, the current attacks on his detractors call for "overthrowing" them. The fact that these attacks are now appearing in east China further points to orchestration of the "defense" of Chou for political reasons.


Almost from the beginning of the anti-Teng campaign, some Chinese seemed to interpret it as indirect criticism of Chou En-lai--if only because Teng was Chou's hand-picked successor and represented the continuation of the premier's popular policies. The demonstrations may have been designed to influence discussions in a major leadership meeting currently in progress concerning the future course of the campaign and Teng's ultimate fate.

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An editorial in today's *People's Daily*, presumably inspired by anti-Teng forces, says that the campaign is not aimed at discrediting Chou and that it will continue against Teng.

The shows of strength both by pro- and anti-Teng forces suggest that the leadership in Peking remains in deadlock.



#### NOTES

The <u>Soviet</u> navy continues to shift its forces in the Mediterranean, partly in response to US naval moves.

As of midday yesterday, the Soviets had two cruisers, a destroyer, a frigate, and an intelligence collector watching the ll-ship US force southeast of Crete. One or more Soviet attack submarines probably are also in the area.

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Cuba Angola	25X1
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The Soviets, in talks with Westerners, continue to  $\overline{play}$  down the significance of Egyptian President Sadat's abrogation of the Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty.

A Soviet Foreign Ministry official responsible for Middle East affairs told a British official that the treaty abrogation only formalized the existing situation. He said relations might be sour "for several years," but that the Soviets are convinced they will eventually improve.

Soviet public comments, however, are designed to stir Egyptian apprehensions about future Soviet actions and to promote questioning about the wisdom of Sadat's actions. The Soviets' formal protest note to Cairo last week, in fact, has stirred an outpouring of charges of Soviet meddling from the Egyptian press and Egyptian public figures.

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Tanzanian President Nyerere and Mozambican President Machel are trying to tighten their control over outside aid to the Rhodesian nationalists.

Their intent is partly to limit non-African involvement with the guerrillas. They are also concerned that direct Soviet, Cuban, and Chinese aid to the rival factions of the nationalist African National Council could intensify internal divisions and weaken the insurgency against the Smith government.

Last week the Tanzanian foreign minister told the ambassadors of a number of communist and Western countries that, from now on, all outside support for the nationalists is to be channeled through Tanzania and Mozambique by the African Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity.